Masthead Logo

Akadimia Filosofia

Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 3

5-2015

Our Time: Existentialism in the Age of Fear
Michael S. Dauber
Fordham University, mdauber@fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/apps
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Dauber, Michael S. (2015) "Our Time: Existentialism in the Age of Fear," Akadimia Filosofia: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://fordham.bepress.com/apps/vol1/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akadimia Filosofia by an
authorized editor of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact considine@fordham.edu.

view of human life and nature that applies to
all in our daily routines, leaving us
simultaneously with no true roadmap for life
while placing the control entirely in our
hands by providing the very framework to
make the roadmap. Jean-Paul Sartre argued
that writing should be “engaged” or
“committed,” making reference to real
issues and problems in an effort to change
the world.1 Philosophy should proceed in the
same way: it should be committed to
reshaping the world into a better place and
helping individuals to ease through the
struggles life presents. Existentialism,
arguably the most committed philosophy
ever proposed, attempts to do exactly that.
Some historical or cultural narrative
that molds the minds and actions of its
people invariably defines every generation.
Historically, existentialist authors have seen
this narrative as something to overcome
using the power of human freedom. For
Fyodor Dostoevsky, it was the deficiencies
of a classist, austere Russian society2. SØren
Kierkegaard responded to the orderliness of
Hegelian philosophy and rebelled against
the notion that faith should be “easy.”3
Friederich Nietzsche played the antichrist to
Kierkegaard’s work, encouraging people to
overcome the strictures of religion that
prevented them from enjoying human life
and all its various pleasures since religions
were an illusion in the first place: living
ascetically toward some sort of afterlife was
a waste of the only existence one would ever
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Abstract: This paper focuses on reawakening existentialism from its realm of
philosophical inactivity over the past few
decades. Existentialism is still very much a
“committed” philosophy, providing us with
an approach to life that gives us courage in
the face of tremendous adversity. Indeed,
this philosophy enables us to focus on what
matters most in our own lives by freeing
ourselves from the burdens of fear and
unrealistic expectations given to us by those
who seek to control our futures. Such a
conception of modern existentialism
introduces the notion of existential courage:
what the modern existentialist must
overcome is the fear that results from agents
who wish to take away human liberty.
A colleague of mine recently told me
that existentialism has been relatively
inactive or irrelevant for so long that it can
largely be considered a historical period.
The point was that existentialism was
“done” or “finished” in the same way that
Kant’s or Plato’s philosophies are done:
there is no more progress to be made, no
more original work to be done, and so many
counter-arguments have been made that it no
longer can have any true influence on the
contemporary age. However it seems to me
that existentialism is one of the more
resilient philosophies to ever have been
proposed, renewing itself with fresh content
as generations pass and carrying the
message of human freedom, authenticity and
choice into everyday life far more than any
other philosophy. Indeed, existentialism is
not simply an academic discipline: it is a
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have.4 Martin Heidegger5 and Sartre6 took
the same route; however they argued that
one primarily needs to overcome the fear
one has of death and live authentically,
making the choices one actually desires
instead of being governed by the will of “the
they” (Das Man, meaning “others”).7
Sartre and Beauvoir8 wrote in a time
much like our own. After the horrors of two
World Wars, the Holocaust, and the advent
of the atom bomb, the western world lived
in terror of nuclear annihilation at any time.
Such was the worst possible scenario, with
the least terrible scenario being a nonnuclear World War III between the
democratic nations and the Soviet Union. As
such, both philosophers focused their work
on living one’s life in light of the inherent,
constant possibility of one’s utter
annihilation and providing some kind of
justification for ethical behavior. Sartre
understood that without a creator or
predetermined essence of humanity and
morality, the notion of “Good” was
completely arbitrary, and so terrible
atrocities and violations of peaceful
existence were possible at any time.9 While
Sartre and Beauvoir both argued that we
have a logical obligation to act in respect to
the freedom of others as a logical extension
of recognizing our own freedom, such an
idea ignores the egoistic metaphysical
priority we assign to our own self and its
own freedom: we always experience our
own self as a higher priority entity because it

is one’s own-most concern.10 Such is not
necessarily a morally blameworthy concern.
To a certain extent it is simply in our nature,
a biological construct to ensure our own
survival, and in a world where the good is an
arbitrary, relative distinction, judging
someone’s strong concern for one’s own
interest is simply irrational: it presupposes a
notion of the good as correct when that
conception is exactly what must be proved.
In the present age, we have not truly
departed from the age of fear. Rather, the
fear individuals and collectives experience is
more sinister, more personal, and more
mathematically imbalanced. The defining
moment of our generation, the governing
paradigm under which we operate, is the
terrorist attacks of 9/11, which demarcated a
gestalt shift in the way we understand world
politics, interfaith relations, and the impact
of others in the global age. Instead of the
peaceful acceptance and optimism that
reigned supreme after the fall of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War, world
politics and cognitive assessments of
interactions were replaced by the everpresent fear of the next terror attack. The
end of one’s possibilities11 that Heidegger
prophesied for each individual life became
an ever-present possibility that was not only
inevitable, but always more likely. Rather
than death by natural causes, accidents, or
some other crime, individuals needed to
worry about the end of their lives coming in
an explosion on the way to work or when
attending a sporting event. The possibility is
always there.
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This idea stems from the ontological and
phenomenological priority of Dasein (human
existence, consciousness). While he makes no claim
to normative ethics here, it is easy to make that leap
in light of our own biological knowledge and
phenomenological experiences. See Heidegger, 4142.
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“The possibility of the impossibility of existence
[Existenz] in general. As possibility, death gives
Dasein nothing to ‘be actualized…’” Heidegger, 251.
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What demarcates this fear from
others? In the first place, there is the
paradox of solidarity: at the same time as we
are united by the ever present fear that our
possibilities may end by a terrorist attack,
we are, at the same time, on an island by
ourselves. Nuclear annihilation is certainly
far more destructive in terms of the overall
consequences, but in the age of terrorism
there is the isolationist notion that the
tragedy of the attack is always mine. If I am
the victim, it is the result of bad luck, simply
being in the wrong place, or poor judgment
in failing to notice the telltale signs: a
suspicious package, someone trying to
conceal something, etc. If I am the
bystander, however, the tragedy is still, in a
sense, my own: I now have to live in a world
increasingly governed by fear and paranoia,
a constant shadow that skews my judgment
and makes feeling safe impossible. The
result is that, in the positive sense, there is
no collective solidarity: in death I am alone,
and in survival I live in fear.
There is another aspect in which
extremist violence seems inherently more
unjust than any potential destruction during
the Cold War, and this is a vague conception
of innocence. In cases of radical extremism,
the victims are rarely combatants or other
public authority figures, although they
certainly may be included as targets. Rather,
many if not most of those involved in such
attacks are, for all intents and purposes,
innocent. They did nothing to the attackers
in any positive way unless one wishes to
claim that they played a passive role in the
structure of capitalism or their country’s
deeds by the fact of their existence. This is
true in natural law cases, in which morality
is seen as an ultimate metaphysical reality,
and in the nihilism that results if relativism
is true. Even if there is no predetermined
moral code, we still function under a notion
of justice, and morality becomes a matter of
whether one did something to deserve to

	
  

have a “nice” thing or a “mean” thing done
to them. In the case of the victims of
extremism, most have done absolutely
nothing to merit such an action. In the Cold
War one can make the same argument, yet
again we are confronted with the more
personal nature of extremism and the notion
that the old conflicts were about national
forces in general, not individual, everyday
people. The Cold War was also more about
survival, whereas extremists try to remake
the world according to their own wishes.
Westerners must also live in a world
in which the illusion that we are loved by
the rest of the world is completely shattered.
This may not be as true for previous
generations as it is for those born in the
early nineties, for they had already
experienced the effects of the struggle
between democracy and communism. For
our generation, however, there was a
pronounced gestalt shift in how we looked at
the world. I, for instance, can clearly
remember a time as a young child when I
thought everyone in the world loved each
other and nobody hated America because it
was the land of peace and freedom. That
illusion was shattered far too early for many
children of the world: we grew up feeling
that a large number of the world’s citizens
would gladly see us all dead, ruining our
collective innocence.
There is, regrettably, a kind of
solidarity in the negative sense as well, an
exaggerated form of something that Derrida
pointed to in our dealings with others: the
masses and authorities in general seem to
have a general mistrust of any person who
looks like they are from the Middle East.
Admittedly, organizations like Al Qaeda and
ISIS are primarily run by Muslim
extremists. However, it is a gross mistake to
assume that every man, woman, and child of
Middle Eastern descent or Muslim faith is a
terrorist, and is indeed one of the great
travesties of our time. At the same time,
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however, Derrida’s work points out that we
can never truly know if the other is a friend
or a foe. Such is even encoded in the origins
of the word “stranger.”12 We cannot,
however, simply assume that the other is
trying to hurt us, both because such is
morally wrong, and because of sheer
statistics: the immensely vast majority are
not terrorists and follow the true, peaceful,
tolerant tenets of Islam, and the terrorists
come from an incredibly small, perverted
distortion. Unfortunately, tragic events stick
out in the mind far more than their absence,
and so the result is an “us against them”
mentality, a destructive solidarity of
ignorance and hate that makes true peace
impossible.
There is another type of fear that our
generation must confront that is far less
sinister than the fear of terrorist annihilation,
but is certainly more personally gripping.
We have been told growing up that the
generation that fought World War II was the
greatest generation, a generation filled with
heroic and brilliant (in both a good and a
bad sense) individuals responsible for the
most important conflicts, events, and social
changes the world has ever known. The
ensuing Cold War brought on an age of
innovation as the arms race between the
United States and Soviet Union grew, even
forcing man to turn his eyes upward to space
exploration. Our generation must live in the
constant shadow of those great times,
aspiring not even to top those achievements,
but simply to live up to a proportionate level
of success.
There is an old saying that the
greatest desire a parent can have, aside from
their child’s happiness, is for their child to
do better in life and be more successful than
they were. The problem in our time is that
this simply may not be possible for everyone
anymore. There comes a point at which

one’s family can climb no higher on the
ladder of success. The most obvious
examples are billionaires, the financial
masters of the world: where are their
children to go? Or imagine being the son of
a famous person: unless you do the same or
better than your parent, anything you do will
be a step down. The same applies to
ordinary families as well, perhaps not in the
sense of reaching one’s zenith, but in terms
of one generation simply not being able to
climb higher: perhaps one’s parents simply
did so well that one may not be able to
surpass them. Indeed, one of the greatest
fears we face is not reaching our own
potential due to circumstances we cannot
control, or even worse, failing to reach the
expectations others force on us. This may be
because of their naturally endowed gifts, the
financial situation they were born into, and
the global economy, which has taken
massive hits in the recent decades. Interest
in banks is no longer at the staggeringly
beneficial rate it was in the eighties,
minimum wages have become stagnant, the
job market is horrendous (especially for
some of the more enjoyable careers that one
might pursue), and there is no new frontier
to expand into that would give new
resources and opportunities to the youth of
the world. We are trapped in the limits of the
Earth, struggling to make the most of the
comparatively scant opportunities for drastic
growth we are given.
This picture of hopelessness gets
dramatically worse as one travels outside of
the Western world to places where economic
triumph has been impossible for centuries. If
one is born in an impoverished country in
Africa or southern Asia, one has little
opportunity to improve one’s circumstances
because opportunities are far more scarce,
and one must compete with far more
immense numbers of people. Even if aid is
given, more often than not it falls into the
wrong hands or is taken by corrupt authority
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figures and never reaches those who need it
most. For individuals in those situations,
freedom is more of a distant ideal than a real
possibility. Freedom has become a luxury
for the rich individuals of the world who
actually have the capacity to pursue it.
What is to be done about the horrible
predicament in which man finds himself?
We must remember that we are always free,
no matter what our situation looks like.
Sartre was a big proponent of taking full
responsibility for one’s choices. Even in
situations in which one would die if one did
not do something evil, Sartre insisted that
the choice was still ours, that we must still
take responsibility and control of our
actions.13 The same is true for both kinds of
fear that grip our world. In the terror case,
one must not be afraid to live one’s life.
Heidegger wrote that recognizing, accepting,
and owning the end of one’s possibilities as
a certainty in life was a means of helping
one give meaning to the time one has, thus
helping one live authentically: one does
what one actually wants to do, not what
others think one should, because one
recognizes the certainty of death.14 Putting
off one’s deepest desires because one will
presumably always have more time results,
more often than not, in dying before one has
had the chance to do anything one wants to
do at all. Sartre wrote similarly, describing
the notion of “bad faith” as denying the
reality that one always has control and one is
ultimately responsible for one’s choices and
existence.15
If we are to live authentically, then,
we must not just be concerned about what
others want us to do, but about what others
try to force us to do. The most tragic
consequence that extremism and violence

can achieve is not physical destruction: if
one is destroyed, one will no longer be
capable of even processing that suffering.
Rather, the greatest harm that evil can
produce is the destruction of our freedom. If
we yield to the possibility of demise, the
impossibility of any true sense of lasting
security, and the fear that the dark forces of
the world wish to inflict on us, we lose any
sense of what we are. Man is essentially free
in that he has the power to decide his life for
himself, the power to strive for meaning in
what would otherwise be a meaningless
existence. Yielding to the forces of violent
conformism defies our own existence and
makes a meaningful life impossible, and
destroys any chance of using our lives to the
fullest. We must be cautious, however,
because extremists can use the notion of
authenticity to their own ends. However,
their desires run counter to the implicit sense
of justice that we have already discussed, a
code we all operate under in some way or
another. If the extremist wishes to claim his
actions are just, the burden of proof is on
him, a burden it is impossible for him to
satisfy, especially given the overwhelming
condemnation of his way of life.
The same notion applies to the fear
of not achieving one’s potential or failing to
satisfy the expectations of others. The great
existentialists were always concerned with
overcoming what others wanted of us, either
for good reasons or bad. As an exercise of
own freedom, we must recognize the need to
take the paths we hold significant, to become
what we want to be, not what others wish for
us. If we are the masters of our own fates
and we are the force that gives our own lives
meaning, then “failing” to reach the goals
others set for us is itself a meaningless
concept: we can only fail if we fail
ourselves, for the expectations of others are,
themselves, meaningless unless we choose
to give them any credence. The only way we
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fail is if we refuse to acknowledge and
empower ourselves with our own freedom.
Thus we must strive constantly to
overcome. We must overcome the
expectations and life goals and meanings
that others wish to encumber us with. We
must strive to overcome the fear that we
have of terrorists and extremists who wish to
annihilate us. And we must strive to
overcome the notion that we will not be
good enough, that we will not live up to our
potential or what we should accomplish. The
only values that truly matter in this world
are those we choose to adopt, and the only
meaningfulness to be had is the meaning we
give ourselves. We must, therefore, adopt a
sense of existential courage: we must be
courageous in the face of uncertainty, in the
face of death, and the face others. Only by
living courageously can we achieve a truly
free and meaningful existence.
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